Without a Constitutional amendment, this provision would likely be struck down by the courts in view of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978).

The language here, most of which is mirrored from Amendment, Section 5, enjoys extra protection from being altered as it is more difficult to alter a Constitutional amendment than a statute.

It is the purpose and effect of the National Initiative to mitigate the influence of money within government as it relates to initiatives. Only natural persons can contribute funds in an initiative campaign. In legal parlance a natural person is a de facto person, as distinguished from a de jure or virtual person such as a corporation. The logic is simple, since only a natural person can vote then only a natural person should be able to contribute money for the purpose of supporting or opposing an initiative. The effect of money spent in a campaign is mitigated in another respect. Voters have demonstrated uncanny common sense in making political decisions when they have the basic facts surrounding an issue. The Democracy Act is designed in such a way that the Electoral Trust prior to and throughout the voting period will make all pertinent facts about an initiative available to voters. The effect of this publicly funded communication process will be to substantially reduce the impact of campaign contributions. This section of the Act is not intended to prohibit organizations from communicating the organizations' positions on initiatives to their members, stockholders or other stakeholders; or to prohibit the news media from editorializing on initiatives. It is aggressive acts of coercion or inducement, whether covert or overt, that this section intends to prohibit.

To properly appreciate the implications of this section, it is worth reviewing some pertinent history. Although initiative is suppose to enhance the expression of the will of the People, corporations have already co-opted the initiative process to wage corporate warfare. Here follows an excerpt from Smith and Tolbert (2004) pp. 107-110:

Not all interest groups become involved in the initiative process primarily to pass laws or to amend state constitutions. Citizen lawmaking affords interest groups the opportunity to make mischief. During the 1990s, a handful of interest groups began advancing ballot measures that were not designed specifically to pass substantive laws or amendments but were intended to disrupt the balance of a state's interest group system. Typically, national interest groups are behind such initiatives designed to drain the resources of the targeted groups, which are expected to oppose the measures. Rather than a way to enact substantive laws or amend state constitutions, citizen lawmaking in this case is a means by which interest groups can transform the balance of the state's interest group system. While Progressive Era scholars never envisioned this use of citizen lawmaking, it is yet another indirect effect of the process.

Republican insider Grover Norquist, the executive director of the not-for-profit Americans for Tax Reform, pioneered this devious yet legal use of citizen lawmaking. His scheme was to use the initiative process to drain the resources of organized labor, thereby depriving Democratic cadidates of campaign funds. Stuffing his organization's coffers in 1996 with more than $4.5 million courtesy of the Republican National Committee, Norquist led the effort to place several conservative initiatives on statewide ballots. Norquist funneled a substantial amount of the committee's money to issue groups in California, Colorado, and Oregon to promote antitax and "pay-check protection" ballot measures. In 1996, for example, Norquist's Americans for Tax Reform contributed $509,500 to Oregon Taxpayers United, the sponsor of Measure 47, a tax-limitation initiative. The successful measure, which reduced property taxes and limited annual tax increases, had the direct effect of downsizing state and local governments in Oregon. While he certainly backed the initiative for its substantive value, Norquist's support for the measure also stemmed from the fact that it would weaken organized labor and the Democratic Party. "Every time you nick the budget," Norquist crowed following the antitax victory in Oregon, "somewhere a Democratic precinct worker loses his job."

In 1998, Americans for Tax Reform sponsored other measures in an effort to weaken organized labor by strategically using citizen lawmaking. The group transferred $441,000 to the Campaign Reform Initiative in California, the official sponsor of Proposition 226, a pay-check protection measure. Unions in California (aided by contributions from labor organizations across the country) spent more than $23 million fighting June 1998 primary initiative, which they dubbed "paycheck deception." A similar situation occurred in Oregon in November of that year, with unions fighting off another Americans for Tax Reform--sponsored paycheck-protection initiative. Had the two measures passed, they would have required unions to obtain annual authorizations from their members to collect dues to be used for political campaigns. Despite losing both initiatives, Norquist's tactic nevertheless paid dividends, as organized labor's efforts to defeat the measures resulted in unions having significantly less money to pour into the November candidate elections. At a 1999 conference in Washington, DC, Norquist stated with pride, "Even when you lose, you force the other team to drain resources for no apparent reason."

Norquist's strategy for utilizing citizen lawmaking as an offensive weapon to alter the balance of power among interest groups in a state has been replicated elsewhere. Gary Boyce, a Colorado rancher in the San Luis Valley, took a page from Norquist's playbook in 1998. Boyce and his California-based Stockman's Water Company financed two ballot initiatives, Amendments 15 and 16, both of which dealt with water rights in the valley's Closed Basin. Although the Colorado electorate easily defeated the two initiatives---each received less than a quarter of the total vote---the measures served their tacit purpose. The widespread coalition of opponents---including the Colorado Water Congress, San Luis Valley businesses and farmers, Trout Unlimited, the Colorado Farm Bureau and the Cattlemen's Association, the Sierra Club, and the Rio Grande Water Conservation District---was forced to spend more than $1 million to defeat the measures. This was perhaps Boyce's primary motivation for placing the two ill-fated measures on the ballot. A million dollars was nothing to Stockman's Water, but fighting the initiative bled the financial resources of San Luis Valley ranchers and farmers. The real battle over water rights in the valley would be decided in water courts. Boyce revealed to a reporter that his initiatves were designed in part to render his opponents as weak as possible---"to make sure the playing field is level" in upcoming legal battles. Indeed, Boyce admitted that although he did not intend to bankrupt the Rio Grande Water Conservation District, "if that happened as a result, I wouldn't shed a tear."

Most recently, in 2000, the Association of Washington Business informed its members that it would begin aggressively using the initiative to pursue public policies it favored that were languishing in the state legislature. The association had previously promoted ballot measures, including a hazardous waste cleanup initiative in the late 1980s and a state spending limitation inititive in 1993, and had spent several million dollars opposing initiatives lowering taxes on car registrations and banning affirmative action. But in an internal memo to its members, the organization's rationale for the use of the initiative went beyond merely an instrumental justification to enact public policy by circumventing the state legislature. The business association argued that by sponsoring ballot initiatives, it could substantially weaken its labor counterparts by forcing them to spend money fighting initiatives.

With great creativity, corporations will seek out ways to exploit any incumbent political system. The problem of how to exclude corporate interests from the initiative process is a subtle one.

Stern & Holman, 2002, p. 2 wrote:
The concept that only individuals should be allowed to support or oppose initiatives is laudable, but it may create many problems. It may result in very little information being disseminated during the circulation of an initiative. Group support and opposition to initiatives provides its members and voters with an important voting cue. Many voters decide how to cast ballots on candidates and issues based on which groups support or oppose those candidates and issues, ranging from political party endorsements to the League of Women Voters to the Chamber of Commerce. Perhaps a more appropriate restriction would be to limit contributions, rather than expenditures, for and against initiatives to individuals. This way, the League of Women Voters and the Chamber of Commerce, for example, may solicit contributions from individuals concerned about a ballot initiative, and use only those funds to make expenditures for and against the measure.

This recommendation was adopted.

Jacob, 2002, p. 6 wrote:
There is some validity to the stance that corporations, unions, PACs, and other associations do not -- as non-persons -- have rights. But their members do have rights to freely associate with one another. Banning organizations from communicating with their members or forbidding individuals from creating associations to advance their political interests violates the basic human rights of the people associating. Furthermore, no harm has been shown under the current state initiative system, which allows these groups to contribute.

Allen, 2002, p. 15 wrote: While I understand the motive behind limiting financial support to “natural persons,” it is both unworkable and elitist. People organize themselves into groups, and it is good that they do. This seems oblivious to these points. Moreover, this limitation will systematically inject an undesirable wealth effect by increasing the power of wealthy individuals relative to those less well off.

Instead of restricting expenditures, the new language restricts contributions. Corporations, unions, PACs, and other associations can lobby for or against an initiative, but only as a service to individual citizens. In soliciting money for promotional activity, an organization must convey with sincerity that contributions are voluntary and that refusal to contribute to an initiative campaign entails no penalty. Furthermore, the organization must disclose any contributions exceeding a monetary threshold set by the Electoral Trust (Act, Section 3-Q) and the communication must identify the person(s) responsible (Act, Section 3-O).