Similar to NI4D, in Nevada, constitutional initiatives must pass in two successive elections to be ratified. For example, Nevada question 9 concerning the exemption of food from taxation failed because, although it was approved in 1980, it was rejected in its second election in 1982. Question 8, on the other hand, concerning taxation of household goods, was approved after its two successful elections, the first in 1980 and the second in 1982.

Under NI4D, the majority of registered voters standard for a constitutional amendment is more rigorous than any existing state law. For statutory initiatives, Wyoming requires "an amount in excess of 50% of those voting in the preceding general election." Ostensibly, the number voting in the preceding general election is a proxy for the number of registered voters. A majority of registered voters implies a minimum participation of 50%, like Wyoming, but the NI4D requirement is a more rigorous because at least 50% of the registered voters need to vote in favor.

It is worth noting that Miller (2009) endorsed the Nevada double election standard and some kind of supermajority for constitutional initiatives as ways to better balance the power of direct democracy against the judicial branch (p. 223). Miller argued that in states where constitutional initiative is too easy, the Madisonian system of checks and balances is upset because the courts cannot adequately check constitutional initiative.

Some states specify different enactment criteria depending on subject matter. For example, "Utah has a requirement that any initiative pertaining to the taking of wildlife must pass by a 2/3 vote" (Waters, 2003, p. 26). NI4D employs a uniform standard regardless of subject matter.

This section, which mirrors Amendment, Section 3, enjoys extra protection from being altered as it is more difficult to alter a Constitutional amendment than a statute.

Following each initiative election conducted by the Electoral Trust; the Trust, directly or through a third party, may conduct a post-election audit to validate the results.

In order for a charter or constitution to be created or amended by initiative, the same initiative must be approved by a majority of registered voters in two successive elections. This requirement reflects the greater significance of constitutional and charter amendments as compared with statute law, and the fact that constitutional amendments are not subject to review by the courts. The six-month delay between elections is intended to engender greater reflection on the part of voters before a final decision. In the event that a constitutional or charter amendment fails to secure a majority in either of the two elections, the initiative fails.

Donovan, 2002, p. 6 wrote:
Constitutional initiatives are far too easy. A body of political theory, and experience with democratic government, argue that constitutions should be relatively difficult to change. The Act allows for Constitutional amendments, on what seems to be any subject, and there are no clear provisions for legislative alteration of Constitutional initiatives. Experience with initiatives in the American states illustrates the difficulties involved with allowing initiatives that amend constitutions in ways that only voters may alter via a subsequent initiative. The Act would establish a relatively easy way for groups to amend the US Constitution. The 5% qualification for Constitutional initiative amendments is a lower bar than exists in most American states that allow constitutional amendments. With this vehicle, at some point our parsimonious map of republican government could swell to match the ridiculous size of state constitutions. The concurrent majorities requirement in the Act does not restrict the number of measures that will qualify.

The legislature can still modify the constitution under Article V procedures.

Some commentators have suggested that the National Initiative makes it easier to amend constitutions. This is actually a false impression. Under the Democracy Act, a constitutional amendment requires approval by more than half the registered voters (not merely half the registered voters participating in the election) in the relevant jurisdiction in each of two successive elections. In other words, voters who abstain from voting are counted as voting against the proposed constitutional amendment.

The Democracy Amendment safeguards the United States Constitution by introducing the more stringent standard for constitutional amendments. The election to enact the National Initiative uses a less stringent criteria---a majority of government-validated votes cast in the previous presidential election. (The more stringent criteria specified in the Democracy Amendment was judged impractical to implement for the National Initiative election, lacking assistance from the Electoral Trust.) The National Initiative election remains more stringent than any other direct legislative act in American history. For example, the ratification of the United States Constitution only required consensus in 9 out of 13 states. The Constitution was not even put to direct vote, but enacted through a series of conventions. In short, the Democracy Amendment introduces the most rigorous standard to date for direct constitutional amendments, thereby permitting the will of the People to be most accurately assessed.

Allen, 2002, p. 14 wrote
I think the proposal for two elections for constitutional change will be taken as demonstrating conceptual confusion in these proposals. What power by statute is there to change the “first principle” of majority vote that, apparently, does not require two votes to enact laws and constitutions?

We are guided by what is practically possible in pursuit of an ideal assessment of the will of the People. Advances in political maturity and technology will make possible the more accurate procedures specified in the Democracy Act.

Tolbert, 2002, p. 6 wrote:
Consider a turnout threshold as an additional requirement for approving federal constitutional amendments.

The minimum turnout to pass a constitutional amendment is 50% of registered voters. Citizens who refrain from voting are counted as voting against the amendment.

Jacob, 2002, p. 5 wrote:
... it would make it tougher to amend state constitutions and local charters. Because federal law supercedes state law, state constitutional amendments cannot diminish any of our federally guaranteed rights. Thus, the two-vote requirement is unnecessarily difficult. A simple majority should be sufficient.

Even in lower jurisdictions, it seems like a useful distinction to distinguish between constitutional amendments and regular statutes. This distinction would be substantially lessened if the conditions for enactment were more similar.

Donovan, 2002, pp. 6-7 wrote:
Given that the bar for qualification is set so low, the bar for enactment of statutory initiatives would also seem too low if outcomes are to be seen as legitimate.

Outcomes of representative processes may be politically legitimate (to the mass public) regardless of whether any sort of popular majority approved the outcome. Rather, legitimacy of representative outcomes depends upon a public process that accommodates many interested parties and groups (i.e. pluralism). When the public suspects the legislative process is corrupted, legitimacy suffers. However, legitimacy in Congress does not depend upon bills being approved by a coalition of legislators who claim to have been elected by an actual national majority of voters. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that the public sees Congressional outcomes as legitimate when it deems the legislative process to be acceptable. The public probably does not think that one group of legislators is not legitimate because fewer people voted for them than voted for another group of legislators of equal size.

In contrast, the legitimacy of direct democratic outcomes rests not as much on process, but on the fact that the outcome was endorsed by a popular majority. Initiative outcomes are only legitimate if this condition holds. But what sort of enactment rules provide for legitimate majority approval of an initiative? The legitimacy of a "majority" is contingent upon how many citizens participate in the decision. As noted above, provisions of the Act may lead to a large number of issues placed before the voters. Although initiatives may increase turnout, particularly in low-turnout elections, there comes a point when voters will be overwhelmed by too many initiatives. Many voters skip the less salient measures placed on state ballots. With turnout in the US low to begin with, this means that many initiative measures are enacted with far less support than what elected officials receive.

There is ample evidence that a participatory quorum reduces the legitimacy of direct democracy (Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007, pp. 19-21). For example, "on 18 April 1999, a referendum was held there [Italy] on reforming the electoral system. The reforms were supported by most of the political parties; 49.6% of the electorate turned out and of these 91% voted for the reforms. But the voters had taken all their trouble for nothing: because the participation quorum of 50% was not quite reached, the reforms did not go ahead."

If an initiative is controversial then plenty of people will vote. If an initiative has overwhelming support (or opposition), the people's decision should be respected even if very few people bother to vote. If the initiative wasn't important then it wouldn't have been qualified.